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ABSTRACT 
Most studies of worker participation examine either formal participatory structures or informal 
participation.  Yet, increasingly, works councils and other formal participatory bodies are 
operating in parallel with collective bargaining or are filling the void left by its decline.  Moreover, 
these bodies are sprouting in workplaces in which workers have long held a modicum of influence, 
authority, and production- or service-related information.  This study leverages a case from the 
healthcare sector to examine the interaction between formal and informal worker participation.  
Seeking to determine whether or not these two forces—each independently shown to benefit 
production or service delivery—complement or undermine one another, we find evidence for the 
latter.  In the case of the 27 primary care departments that we study, formal structures appeared to 
help less participatory departments improve their performance.  However, these same structures 
also appeared to impede those departments with previously high levels of informal participation.  
While we remain cautious with respect to generalizability, the case serves as a warning to those 
seeking to institute participation in an environment in which some workers have long felt they had 
the requisite authority, influence, and information necessary to perform their jobs effectively. 
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Introduction 
Scholars of human resources and of the employment relationship have long insisted that 
empowering, engaging, or involving frontline workers enables managers and organizations to 
parlay workers’ human capital, knowledge, and effort into improved operational performance 
(e.g., Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; Nichols, 1962; Riordan, Vandenberg, & 
Richardson, 2005; Wilkinson & Fay, 2011).  Indeed, what emerged from seminal human relations 
research as a response to early 20th century Taylorist ideals, cemented later in the century by 
employers seeking to address the “blue collar blues” of the 1970s and 1980s, was a genuine attempt 
to acknowledge workers’ social needs and interests in a way that more authoritarian systems had 
not (Nissen, 1997; U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1973).  Add to this the eventual 
construction of a solid theoretical foundation and its appeal as a “win-win solution to a central 
organizational problem” (Strauss, 2006, p. 778), and one can understand how frontline worker 
participation has emerged as a “central strategy for heightening productivity” (Hodson, 2004, p. 
432).  If that were not enough, intensified competition in product and service markets (Scott, 2014) 
and three decades of managerial delayering (McCaffrey, Faerman, & Hart, 1995; Useem, 1992) 
further secured its place in the managerial toolkit. 
Amidst this enthusiasm on the part of scholars and practitioners, one might be surprised to learn 
of a central challenge to the empirical testing of participation’s performance effects: the lack of a 
shared understanding of the term’s precise meaning (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Marchington and 
Suter 2013) on the part of researchers.  In fact, the literature has yet to even converge upon a single 
label for the participation construct (Wilkinson and Dundon 2010).  As noted in Litwin (2015, pp. 
169-170), “Terms such as voice, involvement, and empowerment, sometimes prepended with 
qualifiers like employee, direct or indirect, or online or offline, can be defined any number of ways 
and with varying degrees of specificity.”  In particular, Wilkinson and Dundon (2010, p. 168) note 
that researchers could be referring to something as narrow as “formal, ongoing structures of direct 
communication,” such as teams or team briefings, yet they might also be referring to something as 
informal as “any form of delegation to or consultation with employees.” 
It is this latter distinction—between formal and informal forms of frontline worker 
participation—on which this paper will focus.  To date, the most careful empirical studies have 
shown that worker participation, however labeled, when operationalized in a manner that makes 
sense to the actors in the workplace context in which it is being studied, benefits organizational 
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performance (e.g., Ichniowski, Shaw, & Prennushi, 1997; Litwin, 2011; MacDuffie, 1995).  
Nonetheless, received studies focus almost entirely on formal participatory structures to the 
exclusion of informal ones (cf. Marchington & Suter, 2013).  In fact, while there are studies that 
examine the way different formal participative structures dovetail in the workplace (e.g., 
Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2010) and of “dual systems” of direct and indirect forms of 
worker participation (e.g., Purcell & Georgiadis, 2007), there are very few studies that examine 
the interplay of formal and informal participation on performance. 
Even in a global economy with decreasing levels of conventional unionization, this proves 
problematic as the “representation gap” engendered by the decline in collective bargaining is 
increasingly being filled by other formal participatory structures such as employee involvement 
(e.g., problem-solving groups or what were once called “Quality Circles”) in the U.S., Joint 
Industrial Councils (JICs) or Employee-Management Advisory Committees (EMACs) in Canada, 
Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) in the U.K., European Works Councils (EWCs), and other 
formal manifestations of management- or policy-promoted forms of worker participation 
(Freeman, Boxall, & Haynes, 2007; Kaufman & Taras, 2010). 
This undoubtedly begs a question from managers: where employees already have a modicum 
of influence in everyday decision-making, does the establishment of formal problem-solving 
groups, for example, deliver any marginal benefit to the organization?  As we will show, whether 
formal and informal participative structures complement or undermine one another’s effectiveness 
proves ambiguous from a theoretical perspective.  Consequently, the question must be sorted out 
empirically.  Until it is, we believe this is the sort of research void that leaves even the most 
progressive managers in the lurch. 
The current study makes us early joiners in a conversation that is thankfully underway but long 
overdue.  Building on and responding to Marchington and Suter’s (2013, p. 285) analysis of the 
interplay of “dilute and localized” formal and informal participation in the hospitality sector, we 
take aim at the (otherwise) rhetorical question we pose above by examining the performance 
implications of the introduction of a more far-reaching, formal frontline worker participation 
program in an organization in which some workers report high levels of influence, authority, and 
access to production-related information prior to the formal program’s creation.  We triangulate 
between qualitative and quantitative data sources, exploiting variation in informal participation 
and examine changes in a context-relevant outcome measured identically across multiple 
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departments performing the same kind of work within a single, regional operation of a large, 
integrated, U.S.-based healthcare provider.  Though this embedded, single-case design privileges 
internal over external validity leaving us cautious with respect to generalizability, we argue that 
many aspects of the research design render this a “critical” case, and thus, a conservative test of 
the emergent explanation for the ways that formal and informal participation conflict with one 
another in organizations and workplaces (Batt & Hermans, 2012; Yin, 2014). 
We draw on research in employment relations and on organizations to offer competing 
arguments regarding the interaction of formal and informal participative structures.  On the one 
hand, formal structures may provide much-needed institutional legitimacy to frontline workers 
long seeking to apply their creative problem-solving and tacit knowledge of the service delivery 
process to their everyday work.  On the other hand, formal participation could work to squelch, 
suppress, or displace more effective, entrenched, and organic participative structures that exist 
only informally. 
We weigh these compelling but competing arguments by comparing outcomes for roughly 
30,000 patients.  Through interviews, site visits, and archival research, we are able to identify a 
performance outcome that is both of great interest to the organization and theoretically tractable.  
This same “shoe leather” research afforded us a window into contextualized measures of formal 
and informal participation which we constructed through the company’s annual survey of frontline 
workers and then linked to patient-provided performance data.  This allowed us to estimate the 
simultaneous impact of formal and informal worker participation on performance across 27 
primary care departments over a two-year period.  In this context, we find no evidence of 
complementarity between formal and informal participation.  Rather, our analysis of individual 
workers embedded in departments embedded in this larger, regional healthcare operation suggests 
that while formal and informal participation are both positive drivers of operational performance, 
they dampen one another’s performance benefits.  In light of this finding, we offer an explanation 
for these events founded in institutional theory, allowing us to consider the analytic 
generalizability of our findings.  Thus, the case helps to illuminate a workplace phenomenon that 
likely vexes a great many managers and for which existing theory has yet to provide a satisfying 
answer. 
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Theoretical Background 
One would be hard-pressed to find a careful treatment of frontline worker participation that 
does not begin by acknowledging the aforementioned mélange of terms and their meanings (e.g., 
Barry, Wilkinson, Gollan, & Kalfa, 2014; Dietz, Wilkinson, & Redman, 2010; Wilkinson & Fay, 
2011) that researchers have come to apply haphazardly and interchangeably.  This discussion is 
important, because the choice of one label over another—voice vs. involvement vs. empowerment 
vs. engagement vs. participation, etc.—transcends semantics to reflect both denotation and 
connotation.  The upshot of all of these discussions, however, is that researchers in this space 
should declare which label they are going to use and what they mean by it.  Even more important, 
they must understand and analyze the specific practices that they are examining and what those 
practices mean to those in the research context (Wilkinson & Fay, 2011).  Against this backdrop, 
we share Strauss’s (2006) view that “participation” captures a level of influence that is not 
necessarily reflected in “voice.”  Whereas “voice” implies that the worker is speaking, 
“participation” suggests a deeper level of continuous, iterative engagement on the part of the 
worker and that what he or she contributes is not being altogether ignored. 
The theoretical roots of the connection between participation and performance are broadly and 
firmly entrenched, coming from more micro-oriented organizational theorists and psychologists 
of work (e.g., Coch & French, 1948; Lawler & Hackman, 1969; Vroom, 1969) as well as from 
more institutionally-focused labor relations researchers (e.g., Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Slichter, 
Healy, & Livernash, 1960).  With this wealth of theory, one might expect a commensurate degree 
of empirical substantiation.  In fact, the productivity benefits of worker participation and even of 
its more broadly-encompassing cousin, high-performance work systems (HPWS), have not been 
demonstrated conclusively in large-n, national samples (e.g., Cappelli & Neumark, 2001; Freeman 
& Kleiner, 2000; Guest, Michie, Conway, & Sheehan, 2003). 
One possible explanation for this missing evidence is that those who run the firm are not 
genuinely committed to frontline engagement.  This could yield a situation in which workplace-
level participative structures exist in principle, but are neither buttressed by an organization that 
has made a “strategic choice” to engage its workforce nor reinforced by an employment contract 
that sufficiently incentivizes frontline workers to put forth discretionary effort and tightly-held 
information (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Ichniowski & Shaw, 2003; Jones, Kalmi, & Kauhanen, 
2010b; Litwin, 2015).  Empirical work that has accounted for these sources of heterogeneity has, 
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indeed, demonstrated the participation-performance link (e.g., Batt, 1999; Litwin, 2011; 
Rubinstein, 2000).  Likewise, those studies that are constrained to a large number of workplaces 
in a single, tightly-defined sector—allowing for physical rather than dollarized measures of 
outputs—have revealed evidence of a participation-performance link (e.g., Ichniowski et al., 1997; 
MacDuffie, 1995).  This last group of studies, while tackling the so-called “black box problem” 
(Purcell & Georgiadis, 2007), has been much less successful at isolating the impact of worker 
participation from the influence of all those complementary innovative employment practices that 
reinforce it.  This results not from a flaw in research design, but from the researchers’ subscription 
to the now well-accepted theory that innovative employment practices operate as a coherent, 
mutually-reinforcing “bundle” or “cluster” to drive performance. 
To this we add another potential explanation for participation’s weaker-than-anticipated 
performance effects—the conflation of formal structures and processes attendant to worker 
participation with those less formal manifestations of participation.  Most scholars have 
traditionally defined participation—or voice, involvement, etc.—as formal.  Indeed, some 
treatments go as far as to explicitly exclude informal mechanisms from their definition of 
participation or of participative structures (e.g., Barry et al., 2014; IDE, 1993).  Whether this is a 
conceptual oversight or simply a concession to the use of aforementioned large-n datasets that 
canvas formal participation but not informal participation is not clear.  However, this observation 
does suggest that theoretical advancement on this front may well come from research designs built 
around the participation patterns of a constrained and well-understood set of workplaces (Yin, 
2014). 
 
Formal Participation 
In simplest terms, formal participation “relates to codified or prearranged structures” (Barry et 
al., 2014, p. 534).  Examples range from conventional collective bargaining covering wages and 
other terms and conditions of employment to more workplace-level and work-focused bodies that 
have in some instances helped fill the void left by unionization’s decline, including works councils, 
plant safety committees, and quality circles.  In the case we will present, the organization calls its 
formal participative bodies “unit-based teams” (UBTs), structures that provide frontline workers 
the chance to meet regularly offline to analyze workflows and to improve the work processes that 
influence performance outcomes.  The program also affords frontline workers opportunities to 
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make material changes to how they undertake their daily work, so long as they can link those 
modifications to measurable performance improvements.  Managers also encourage UBT 
members to step away from their work for short intervals on a daily or shift basis, where and when 
possible, to “huddle” to discuss the real-time functioning of their departments vis-à-vis the 
workflow and other process innovations being enacted by the UBT. 
Given the literature’s (often implicit) focus on formal participation, we have, in effect, already 
laid out the fundamental theories linking formal participation to organizational or operational 
performance.  We also want to make the case that formal participation remains important in 
practice even though many of the most-widely discussed innovations around participation in the 
U.S. have occurred in the context of unionized employment relationships (e.g., Kochan, Eaton, 
McKersie, & Adler, 2009; Rubinstein & Kochan, 2001).  Yet, while the boldest experiments in 
this space in the U.S. may actually require the presence and cooperation of a union in the 
workplace, there is ample evidence of formal participation programs in nonunion workplaces as 
well (e.g., Eaton & Voos, 1994; Kaufman & Taras, 2010).  In the U.K., Willman, Gomez, and 
Bryson (2009) find that the incidence of Joint Consultative Committees—which are management-
initiated by definition—is actually slightly higher in unionized workplaces than in nonunion ones, 
whereas the incidence of team briefings is about the same irrespective of workplace union 
representation.  Likewise, European Works Councils and Health and Safety Committees in the 
U.K. can operate in unionized and nonunion workplaces, and German Works Councils generally 
operate in parallel but independently of trade unions.  In still other cases, union decline has actually 
created opportunities for nonunion, albeit still formal, opportunities for worker participation to 
emerge (Gomez, Bryson, & Willman, 2010; Kaufman & Taras, 2010).  These include regular 
meetings or scheduled exchanges between management and frontline workers or the formal 
designation of problem-solving groups. 
 
Informal Participation 
There is much less theory and research linking informal participation to performance, in large 
part because in contrast to formal participation, informal participation does not involve any explicit 
mechanisms.  Once again taking our lead from Strauss (1998, p. 15), we define informal 
participation as “the day-to-day relations between supervisors and subordinates in which 
subordinates are allowed…input into work decisions.”  To this, we add an informational 
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component.  That is, the interactions that signal informal participation must allow for “information 
passing, consultation, and the seeking of ideas” (Marchington & Suter, 2013, p. 286).  Marchington 
and Cox (2007, p. 189, emphasis added) further build on and clarify the construct, noting that 
Informal participation can be characterized as a product of 
management style or a particular set of leadership behaviors, based 
on whether or not managers actively seek and respond to the views 
of employees or delegate when [m]aking decisions about workplace 
matters. 
This implies that informal participation exists in the eye of the beholder, i.e., each individual 
worker’s assessment of the scope of the everyday, undocumented ways that he or she can take 
action alone or concertedly to address performance issues.  Thus, informal participation captures 
workers’ perceptions of the extent to which they can exercise authority and influence in carrying 
out their work and that they have the requisite, real-time organizational or customer-related 
information to do this work and to apply this influence effectively. 
This approach and orientation yields ramifications both mensural and conceptual.  Not only 
must informal participation be measured by asking workers directly about perceptions of authority, 
influence, and access to information, but it can obtain even where workers have no access to formal 
participative structures. 
One can look to the organizations literature for research linking informal forms of participation 
to organizational performance.  The classic review by Cotton and colleagues (1988), for example, 
found that informal participation was positively associated not only with job satisfaction, but with 
productivity and performance.  However, the authors never explain precisely how the studies they 
draw from in their review actually define informal participation.  Other analyses of participation 
or engagement in a broader context, presumably beyond the bounds of formal structures, also 
suggest that participation drives discretionary effort on the part of employees (Fox, 1974), 
including through more carefully-measured constructs such as organizational citizenship behavior 
(OCB) (e.g., Cappelli & Rogovsky, 1998; Spreitzer, 1995). 
 
Formal and Informal Participation: Complementary or Conflictual? 
While theory suggests that both formal and informal participation drive performance in a 
positive direction, there has been surprisingly little theorizing and even less empirical investigation 
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of how formal and informal participative mechanisms operate in tandem.  Though Strauss (2006) 
eventually became disillusioned regarding the performance prospects for worker participation, his 
earlier thinking, itself informed by decades of research, seemed sanguine regarding the interplay 
of formal and informal participation.  He notes two different paths by which formal and informal 
approaches could commingle, both of which imply complementarity (1998, p. 18).  First, formal 
participation may itself evoke informal participation.  Second, he expected that formal 
participation would be more successful when introduced “in an atmosphere of informal 
participation.” 
To the contrary, other labor relations scholars offer elements of a theory to counter the 
complementarity argument.  Martinez Lucio (2010) notes that in some cases, management may be 
instituting formal participative structures expressly to wrest power from existing, strong, union-
backed participation structures.  Indeed, scholars of the partnerships propounded by Britain’s late-
1990s Labour government find empirical evidence to backstop the view that partnership delivers 
more to the management side than to workers and that these programs are, at best, a weak 
determinant of workers’ trust in their employers and, likewise, employers’ trust in their workers 
(Guest, Brown, Peccei, & Huxley, 2008; Guest & Peccei, 2001). 
Nonetheless, even where it is not management’s strategic intent to use partnership to pry power 
or control away from workers, “the [mere] presence of formal structures could…hamper the 
growth, sustainability, and contribution of more informal voice practices” (Barry et al., 2014, p. 
531).  Both Barry et al. (2014) and Martinez Lucio (2010) note that in Europe, in particular, 
regulatory pressures for managements to establish formal participative bodies—as opposed to 
managers opting to create these structures of their own volition—could hasten these dynamics. 
We know of just one explicit attempt to understand the interplay of formal and informal 
participation.  Given the early stage of theory-building in this area, Marchington and Suter (2013) 
rightly chose to undertake a case study, on this occasion, in a large, U.K. chain of about 300 
restaurants.  Among other interesting findings, they conclude that in their setting, both managers 
and frontline staff prefer informal channels to formal ones, in part because of the need for managers 
and staff to be able to work together in a pressure-filled environment to meet customer demands.  
They also infer that despite this preference for informal over formal, the two styles of participation 
actually depend on one another to operate effectively, much as Strauss (1998) had theorized. 
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Remaining attempts to sort out this theoretical ambiguity must necessarily come from studies 
that look not at the mix of formal and informal participation but at various configurations of formal 
structures.  Studies that do this generally conclude that mutually-reinforcing bundles of formal 
participative practices, including those “dual-voice” systems that mix direct and indirect 
participation, reveal performance complementarities (e.g., Purcell & Georgiadis, 2007; Pyman, 
Cooper, Teicher, & Holland, 2006), particularly when they are embedded in a broader, high-
performance work system (e.g., Handel & Levine, 2004; MacDuffie, 1995). 
Thus, whether and how formal participative structures and informal mechanisms complement 
or conflict with one another in driving performance remains an open question.  And, given the 
paucity of theorizing undertaken to date in this area, the question is one that we believe is still best 
addressed by a case study approach (Yin, 2014). 
 
Context and Design 
We undertook our research at Kaiser Permanente, an integrated health insurer and healthcare 
provider and the largest health maintenance organization in the U.S.  At the time we conducted our 
fieldwork, it affiliated with over 16,000 general practice and specialty physicians operating out of 37 
hospitals and 611 medical offices across eight semiautonomous regional operations, providing care for 
over 9 million patients.  This required the services of over 172,000 technical, administrative, clerical, 
and care-providing employees, about 100,000 of which were members of one of thirty local unions that 
formed the Coalition of Kaiser Permanente Unions, and thus, were party to Kaiser’s unique labor 
management partnership. 
Formed with an agreement between Kaiser Permanente and the Coalition, the partnership had a 
number of goals.  These included improving the quality of care and involving employees and their 
unions in decisions.  Notwithstanding many largely ad hoc manifestations of worker participation of 
varying degrees of formality1, during its first decade of existence, the partnership had not yet lived up 
to its goal of systematically leveraging Kaiser’s frontline workforce towards improved service to 
patients.  In fact, only 40 percent of partnership-covered employees reported any involvement in the 
partnership, a finding that Kaiser Permanente leadership linked to the lack of consistent, upward 
movement in service quality measures and the dearth of empirical evidence linking features of the 
partnership, in particular, measures of participation, to care quality or service metrics.  As a result, the 
parties resolved that the next crucial step for the partnership was to focus on operational improvement 
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by “bringing partnership to the frontlines.”  This was formalized by the contractual establishment of 
unit-based teams as the “basic unit responsible for work and results in a particular area” as well as a 
larger regional and national infrastructure to support them.  The latter would be necessary to ensure that 
UBT members were trained in performance improvement methods, availed of business information and 
near real-time performance data, and in receipt of other forms of support as needs arose (Kochan, Eaton, 
McKersie, and Adler 2009). 
Our initial, preliminary examination of the UBT program was broad in scope and mainly 
qualitative.  Given our interest in developing a fundamental understanding of how the program 
operated at the workplace level, our sampling was purposive—not random.  We focused solely on 
unit-based teams that Kaiser Permanente management and union leaders determined had 
successfully worked through early challenges to become effective in their performance 
improvement efforts.  With the goal of pinpointing what makes a high-performing UBT so 
successful, we studied 16 units in five regions identified by partnership staff as high-performing 
using pre-specified criteria and working in a range of settings, including primary care, a lab, 
environmental services, and hospital-based direct care.  In each case, a member of our team 
observed either sit-down team meetings or daily “huddles” or both and, where possible, the 
undertaking of everyday work.  We also conducted interviews with labor- and management-side 
UBT members and leaders, and sometimes, additional regional staff supporting the UBT program. 
We learned from our work on the ground conducted as part of this preliminary study that successful 
unit-based teams enacted a very carefully-planned and ordered methodology to establishing themselves 
as a team.  This included a collaborative exercise to develop a team charter as well as training in the 
terminology and the processes of quality improvement.  The training provided UBT members with a 
common language for identifying, testing, and then either modifying or abandoning ideas for improving 
clinical outcomes or service delivery, key for unit-based teams that included a wide diversity of job 
classifications and thus, did not necessarily benefit from the social ties of profession or job classification.  
UBT training also socialized individuals into their new teams by creating a common set of rules and 
expectations, and, when successful, inculcated in members an understanding of and appreciation for the 
most effective ways that these frontline, participative bodies could contribute to the larger organization’s 
mission and often, to specific regional goals as well. 
Having done this, often with the help of regional UBT trainers, high-performing unit-based teams 
would work together to achieve their objectives with support from the people they referred to as their 
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UBT’s “sponsors.”  We determined that the sponsor’s role was crucial to the success of these bodies.  
Sponsors were management- and labor-side representatives who were not intended to be regularly-
participating, ongoing members of a unit-based team, but were responsible for getting the group 
established and for clearing away any organizational obstacles that might exist outside the UBT’s ambit.  
Thus, as crucial as the sponsors’ role was, it was also a delicate balancing act.  First-line managers and 
supervisors were generally active alongside unionized frontline workers in serving on and running unit-
based teams.  However, higher-level managers, multiple levels removed from regular interaction with 
patients, were not intended to sit on unit-based teams.  In general, they were designated solely as 
sponsors, whose responsibility was—as one such sponsor quipped—“to run interference.” 
 
Primary Care in a Single Region: Embedded Units within a Single Case 
As noted above, the goal of the aforementioned preliminary study was to enrich our 
understanding of how UBTs function when they are, in effect, achieving their operational goals.  
And, since these were all departments or groups that had not been high-performing prior to the 
implementation of their UBTs, each could provide information on how they evolved and their 
lessons from that process.  While enormously instructive, for a variety of reasons both analytical 
and practical, we also wanted to develop and test our hypotheses on a completely separate set of 
UBTs.  We wanted to find a large number of UBTs undertaking similar or identical work, under 
the same regional managerial regime, working towards at least one common performance goal.  In 
the course of undertaking the preliminary study, we regularly asked managers and union 
representatives in the organization where we could find a set of UBTs that would meet these quasi-
experimental and practical (i.e., so we could establish ourselves in a single region in order to gather 
the data and observe all of the departments) requirements.  A frequent response was that we should 
look at primary care, as every Kaiser region had many primary care departments.  We settled on 
the primary care UBTs in one particular region (which we agreed not to identify), because its 
managers and workers were the most eager to work with and to share their data with us.2  
Accordingly, while our study is, in a sense, predicated on the single case of Kaiser Permanente, 
we actually leverage variation between 27 observed departments, employing what Yin (2014) 
labels an “embedded” case study design. 
A number of features made these departments ideal for detailed study.  First, there were few 
other examples of a large number of departments doing the same work within a single, regional 
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operation.  Second, these departments were not given a choice of when to opt in or opt out of the 
formal participation program, allowing us to eschew the usual empirical challenges arising from 
self-selection.  They also adopted their equivalent participatory structures at the same time and 
under the same regional management.  Third, they all had at least one, common patient service 
goal, one that was measured reliably over a multi-year observation period and of concern not only 
to Kaiser Permanente itself, but to sectoral actors more broadly: reduced wait times—inarguably a 
key service measure and driver of patient satisfaction (Gittell, 2009; Givan, Avgar, & Liu, 2010), and 
thus a critical performance outcome in the primary care context.  As a regional manager explained, 
Part of the efficiency of the team comes down to, “Can you run the day 
on time?”.  That’s a big complaint we get [here] and in medicine in 
general.  We run behind.  So, what can the team do to help run the day 
on time? 
Healthcare organizations are correct to be concerned about this determinant of patient 
satisfaction and efficiency, since increased competition in the healthcare marketplace in the U.S. 
underscores the need to satisfy patients (Gittell, 2009).  Aside from wait times being a concern to 
Kaiser Permanente managers in particular, Savin (2006) shows that in the U.S. setting, one would 
have to think quite highly of his or her primary care provider to maintain their relationship with 
him or her if they are regularly forced to wait long beyond their scheduled appointment times.  
Thus, wait time represents what Givan et al. (2010, p. 37) call a “hard indicator” of quality and is 
the sort of proximal performance measure that others have called for (e.g., Hunter & Pil, 1995; 
Jones, Kalmi, & Kauhanen, 2010a), as it reflects less noisily than any financial or clinical measure 
how effectively the employees in a primary care department are actually meeting patients’ service 
needs (Noteboom, 2015).  That is, wait times are highly tractable from a theoretical perspective in 
this context, whereas the same cannot be said for more globally pressing clinical outcomes or 
mortality measures. 
Formal and Informal Participation in Primary Care Departments 
Unit-based teams epitomize a formal participatory structure.  And, where they were operating as 
intended, the members of these 27 UBTs agreed on who should lead and facilitate meetings, and then 
took a structured approach to determine where resources were stretched thin and where to expect 
bottlenecks in “rooming”—the name of the process of calling the patient’s name, escorting him or her 
into an examination room, taking their vital signs, and instructing them to wait for their medical 
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provider.  They could then develop ideas and “hunches” for problem-solving, and then regroup weekly 
or even daily to determine which were working. 
With help from their UBT sponsors, UBTs could redesign workflows, reallocate work, or create 
systems to prioritize different work at different times of day, dependent on patient congestion.  UBTs 
could make material changes to patient scheduling, altering the number of appointment slots available 
at different times or ensuring that only certain appointment types (with their varying expected lengths 
and demands on staff) could be scheduled contemporaneously.  If they determined that the source of 
patient backups were providers stepping away to return patient calls, for example, they could block off 
regular intervals of a provider’s schedule for these tasks rather than letting them repeatedly create a 
backlog of delayed appointments.  The key is that aside from identifying the symptoms of the problem—
a line of patients forming in the waiting room—and successfully remedying it in the immediate or near 
term, they could also step back to determine its root causes, experiment with different potential fixes, 
and make material changes to the processes that generated the problem or at least allowed it to persist.  
All of this occurred under the formal participatory apparatus, none of which existed until the creation 
of unit-based teams and the program that supported them. 
At the same time, many frontline workers spoke of having authority and influence and information 
on the performance of their department, either over time or in relation to other primary care 
departments in the region.  In fact, workers implied that these manifestations of what we think of 
as informal participation helped them meet the needs of the organization and of their patients.  
And, they believed these perceptions were longstanding attributes of their work. 
Lacking any formal authority, influence, or access to information on departmental or 
organizational performance, how could workers parlay informal participation into reduced wait 
times?  While individual, “informally participating” workers or even small groups of them could not 
enact larger sorts of system changes on their own without the aid and imprimatur of their UBT, they 
could and often did make exceptions to existing routines as a way to solve immediate or easily-
predictable patient appointment bottlenecks.  For example, they could resolve to call patients with 
scheduled appointments to update them on the backlog, encouraging them to come in later than 
originally scheduled or to reschedule their appointment for an hour later or perhaps for another day 
entirely.  Thus, what we observed in the field proved consistent with research and theory on worker 
participation: one would expect that frontline workers in primary care could reduce wait times through 
both their unit-based teams and through informal channels. 
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Less clear a priori was whether formal and informal participation would reinforce one another in 
driving performance improvements, as some—but by no means all—theory has suggested.  Had the 
formal participatory structures and informal mechanisms in primary care yielded distinct and unrelated 
approaches to addressing a performance issue, one could accept that their parallel operation would be 
complementary or at least nonconflicting.  However, our time on the ground in the focal region, 
informed by our learnings from the overarching, national study revealed this was not the case. 
Consider this comment from a frontline worker who had been temporarily assigned to a region-wide 
role in support of the formal participation program in the focal region.  She noted that many of those 
working to deal with the wait times outside the purview of their departments’ unit-based teams came to 
see the formal participative bodies as “taking them away from their work and their service goals” rather 
than as a device for helping themselves and other workers meet them.  In fact, instead of their continuing 
to serve patients in smaller, informal ways, they were encouraged to contribute to the larger, systemic 
approaches being promulgated by managers and enacted by their unit-based teams.  Furthermore, they 
were actively discouraged from rendering their effective “quick fixes,” as the routine use of exceptions 
in this way undermined efforts to measure and address wait times and to assess the effectiveness of 
experimental, systemic fixes to their underlying causes.  So, for all the potential benefits one could 
expect from formal participation in this context, one could also see its tendency to crowd out other 
constructive steps that were being undertaken through purely informal mechanisms. 
This led us to look into whether departmental supervisors and medical office administrators—first- 
and second-line managers—were—perhaps inadvertently—muzzling those workers and those 
departments achieving high levels of necessarily informal participation outside the ambit of formal 
structures.  If so, then imposition of the formal participation program, even where it proved effective, 
would undermine the mechanisms of informal participation, making their interaction a negative one.  In 
fact, as noted earlier, departmental supervisors were indeed meant to be full participants on their unit-
based teams, but also to relinquish control to frontline workers and to act as coaches rather than as 
superiors.  Yet, these supervisors generally felt the need to exert control over the people and the 
processes deployed in service to performance goals.  Furthermore, medical office administrators, 
the second-line managers to whom these first-line supervisors reported, were not intended to be 
members of the unit-based teams in their charge.  Thus, the most glaring example of managers’ 
reluctance to give up control was administrators’ ongoing, active participation in unit-based teams, 
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including regular attendance at meetings—thereby assuming the role of a fully-participating UBT 
member in addition to their prescribed role as a non-participating UBT sponsor. 
Figure 1 conceptualizes lessons delivered by existing theory and by our qualitative examination 
of the 27 primary care departments under study.  In sum, frontline workers can reshape the service 
delivery process through codified, prearranged participative structures or through undocumented 
means, sometimes individually and sometimes in concert with their co-workers.  Whether or not 
these two mechanisms operating in parallel to boost or erode one another’s operational 
effectiveness is the question we aim to address more rigorously in the next section. 
[----------Insert Figure 1 about here.----------] 
 
Quantitative Data and Methods 
Measures 
Formal Participation, Informal Participation, and Their Interaction in Service Delivery 
In exchange for constraining our analysis to the 27 primary care departments that operate in a 
single region of a large, multi-regional healthcare provider we can examine something much more 
granular than whether or not a firm “has” frontline participation: we can measure whether or not 
workers are part of nearly-uniform, formal participatory structures. 
[----------Insert Table 1 about here.----------] 
We detail the definition, construction, and source of this measure in Table 1 alongside the other 
variables called upon in the quantitative portion of our case study.  Formal participation is derived 
from Kaiser Permanente’s survey of employees which is administered annually by a third-party 
vendor.  Workers are assured confidentiality, are given frequent reminders, and can undertake the 
survey at their desktop computers during regular work hours.  Thus, the response rate is about 
89%. 
Among the questions on the survey is one that allows us to construct a contextualized measure 
of participation: that is, whether or not a frontline employee self-identifies as a member of his or 
her unit-based team and thus, considers himself or herself part of the formal participatory 
apparatus.  Employees answer the question yes or no.  Note that this differs from the way 
Marchington and Suter (2013) assess formal participation; they ask workers in nine restaurant 
locations to select the frequency (on an 8-point scale) with which they read company newsletters, 
look at notice boards, or attend team meetings (that are held when operational pressures permit).  
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However, just as this made sense in their setting, we believe that in our setting, directly asking 
workers to self-declare their involvement in formal participatory structures allows us to eschew 
“frame of reference” problems (Hunter & Pil, 1995), a genuine possibility when respondents are 
posed questions from a generic battery as opposed to those capturing formal participation as it 
exists and is referred to in one’s own workplace.  Moreover, Kaiser Permanente’s labor-
management partnership itself relies on this same survey item to assess formal participation (Miles, 
2015). 
Were care delivered on a one-to-one basis between a single frontline worker and a single 
patient, there would be no need to aggregate this employee data whatsoever.  However, our 
fieldwork and anyone’s experience as a primary care patient make clear that the many-to-one 
structure of work and care delivery in healthcare—the frontline workers in a given department 
collaborate to serve each individual patient—would require us to aggregate individual worker data 
into departments.  While we do not know survey respondents by name, we do know the specific 
department in which each is based and, of course, the year of the survey.  Therefore, we can 
calculate the share of department workers claiming to be members of their UBT in each year, akin 
to the measures and methods employed elsewhere in management research (Vázquez, 2004). 
An additional appeal of this organizational setting and research design was that it afforded us 
an opportunity to measure informal participation from individual worker perceptions which, as we 
have already argued, received research compels us to do.  That is, we can determine to what extent 
a given frontline worker reports having the authority, influence, and information necessary to 
perform his or her job.  To construct this scale, we were able to rely on four survey items that the 
organization has itself long collected as part of the aforementioned annual survey of employees: 
(1.) “I have enough say in how I do my job.”, (2.) “I can quickly access the information I need to 
do my job effectively.”, (3.) “I have the decision-making authority I need to meet the needs 
of…patients and customers.”, and (4.) “In general, how much say or influence do you have over 
decisions affecting your work?”.  Each item is anchored by a 5-point Likert-type rating scale.  For 
items 1-3, the scale ranges from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”).  Similarly, for item 
#4, the scale ranges from 1 (“none”) to 5 (“a great deal”).  We constructed the variable by summing 
each individual employee’s responses to each of the items and then dividing by the number of 
questions answered. 
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Since the measure of informal participation is rooted in survey items designed by the 
organization, it offers the same “frame of reference” benefits noted with respect to the formal 
participation measure.  It is also highly reliable (α = .84).  An eyeballing of the four items described 
in Table 1 reveals that they do pick up on all of the elements of informal participation included in 
our definition of the construct, bolstering both the content and convergent validity of the scale 
(Schwab, 2005).  Furthermore, several of the items comport with those employed in previously 
published empirical accounts of worker participation programs (e.g., Batt, 2004; Jones et al., 
2010a). 
Just as we did for formal participation, we can aggregate and average values for the informal 
participation scale to the level of the department-year, yielding a value that can be linked to every 
single patient visit that took place to that department in that year.  Where our treatment of this 
variable differs from our treatment of the others is with respect to timing.  Each of the other 
variables is included and examined contemporaneously, i.e., at time t.  Since we want to examine 
the dynamics of layering a formal participation scheme atop existing perceptions of informal 
participation, it makes sense to lag this variable, i.e., considering it at time t-1. 
Finally, having used the employee survey to develop contextualized, linear measures of formal 
and (lagged) informal participation, we can create a two-way, multiplicative term to capture their 
interaction in the service delivery process.  This, of course, serves as the focal independent variable 
in the quantitative portion of the case study. 
 
Performance 
Assessing departmental operational performance requires a measure of how long each patient 
sits in the waiting room.  We can construct this from information reported by the patient—the 
number of minutes past one’s scheduled appointment time that a patient must wait—on a post-
visit patient satisfaction survey.  For each of almost 30,000 primary care patients, we know which 
department the patient visited and on which exact day.  This allows us to merge these data with 
the independent variables constructed from the employee survey.  The instrument from which the 
performance measure was constructed is nearly identical to the one used in Litwin (2011), though 
it is now administered on-line rather than by mail.  The response rate is 35 percent.  What results 
from the marriage of these two datasets is a new dataset comprised of n = 29,743 patient visits. 
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Control Variables 
Aside from including items that facilitate our construction of the two participation variables, 
the employee survey also provides each respondent’s job classification, allowing us to measure 
what we label “functional representation.”  Functional representation captures the number of 
distinct job classifications, i.e., the span of job roles, represented on each department’s unit-based 
team, a number which can then be linked to each patient.  As noted above, our fieldwork suggested 
that those teams whose membership spanned more job classifications would be advantaged relative 
to departments whose unit-based teams included representatives of fewer job classifications.  As 
it turns out, both the teams (e.g., Keller, 2001) and relational coordination (Gittell, Seidner, & 
Wimbush, 2010) literatures theorize this relationship—that the number of different functions 
represented serves as a proxy for how much of the work process is actually represented in team 
meetings.  Therefore, both would predict this variable to be a positive driver of service quality.  
Moreover, almost by construction, we would anticipate a positive correlation at the department-
year level between functional representation and formal participation—the higher the share of 
department workers on the unit-based team, the greater the span of jobs represented.  Therefore, 
the omission of a variable capturing the number of distinct job classifications included on a unit-
based team could potentially bias upward any positive estimate of the relationship between the 
incidence of formal participation and our measure of service quality (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Our estimates will also control for time-constant, unobserved variation between departments—
namely patient and case mix—using a vector of department dummies.  One can imagine that 
certain primary care departments serve higher-income or lower-income areas or that some serve 
more elderly patients, differences that could impinge unevenly on performance.  Though our time 
on the ground gives us no reason for caution with respect to unobserved differences in human 
capital or other workforce-related characteristics, these same dummy variables allow us to partial 
out unobserved differences along these lines as well.  Second, while there is no simple statistical 
fix to control for time-varying unobservables, our sample, purposely constrained to a reasonable 
number of broadly homogenous organizational subunits, leaves no obvious drivers of this sort of 
bias.  Rather, what time-varying unobserved variation exists is more likely the result of seasonal 
differences in the size and composition of the case load, time-specific shocks that we capture with 
the inclusion of weekly time dummies, following Jones and Kato (2011). 
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Analytical Procedures 
We next construct the model that allows formal and informal participation to influence 
performance as described above.  We cannot use ordinary least squares (OLS) to predict wait 
times, because it would be unreasonable to assume that the residuals in a linear regression 
predicting wait times would be normally distributed.  All observed wait times will be greater than 
or equal to zero, whereas the support set for the normal distribution includes all real numbers 
(Allison, 2010; Castilla, 2007).  Furthermore, the distribution of observed wait times is 
asymmetrical: most patients barely wait at all, causing an enormous spike around zero with 
monotonically decreasing wait times thereafter.  Consequently, we prefer a duration model, i.e., 
survival or event history analysis. 
When estimating a duration model, one is essentially predicting the probability (or the “hazard”) 
that the focal event occurs each minute, conditional on the values of the independent variables and 
the fact that the event has not yet occurred.  Given our knowledge of the data and the setting, it is 
reasonable for us to buy efficiency by assuming a shape for the hazard function.  From the class 
of parametric proportional hazard models, the Weibull distribution provides a monotonically 
increasing or decreasing shape for the hazard function, governed by an estimable shape parameter 
(Castilla, 2007).3  In particular, we are estimating 
( ) ( )01| ,β β+−= i xxpih t x pt e  
where t represents the wait time (in minutes) as a function of a vector of patient-level predictors, 
x, for each of i patients.  The shape parameter is p, and e is simply the base of the natural logarithm.  
Depending on which model we are estimating, the row vector, ix , will include linear terms for 
formal participation and informal participation, and in some cases, the multiplicative term to 
capture their two-way interaction.  Also included are controls for functional representation and 
dummies for each week of observations and for each department. 
In this framework, a positive coefficient estimate, e.g., ˆ 0β >x , implying 
ˆ 1β >xe , also implies that 
a single-unit increase in x has a positive, multiplicative effect of βˆxe on the baseline “hazard” of a 
patient being called in for his or her appointment.  That is, holding all other variables in place, an 
increase in x would be associated with a decrease in wait time or an increase in operational 
performance. 
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Finally, recall that the construction of the dataset required the use of department-year-level 
means, meaning that the data feature a complex dependence structure.  That is, the focal predictors 
do not truly vary at the patient-level, but rather by department-year.  Without accounting for this 
dependence structure, estimated standard errors would be biased downward.  We address this 
challenge by augmenting our parametric model with a shared frailty term at the level of the 
department-year.  In this way, the shared frailty term can account for known intragroup correlations 
created by our construction of the dataset (Gutierrez, 2002).4 
 
Quantitative Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 displays means, standard deviations, and pairwise correlations for the data.  Note that 
since these variables were constructed by aggregating responses to the employee survey by 
department by year, and then folding them into the patient data, they reflect implicit weighting 
based upon how many patient responses there were for a particular department over the course of 
each year.  The statistical substantiation for this aggregation method rests on one-way ANOVAs 
we estimated for each of the two, linear participation variables in each of the two years of 
observation (Litwin, 2011).  When estimating an ANOVA, a statistically significant F-statistic 
implies that there are differences in means between the groups that significantly exceed the 
differences in means within groups.  Put more crudely, it means that the responses for a given 
group—in this case, a particular UBT in a particular year—“clump together” rather than yield their 
mean from a mix of widely-distributed, extreme responses (James & Williams, 2000).  Across the 
four tests, the smallest (and thus, most conservative) of the test statistics is F = 2.36 (p = .0003), 
implying that there are truly differences-in-means between departments as opposed to noisy data 
within each department creating the false appearance of different means.  With that in mind, notice 
that the mean level of formal participation is 49 percent.  That is, given the way the 29,743 patient 
visits were spread across department-years and given the mean level of formal participation in 
each of those departments in each year, just under half of the frontline workers serving these 
patients were part of the formal participation program.5  On average, each unit-based team included 
between 3 and 4 unique job classifications, the most common being registered nurses, licensed 
practical (or vocational) nurses, and medical assistants. 
[----------Insert Table 2 about here.----------] 
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To most anyone who has frequented medical offices in the U.K. or the U.S., these departments 
perform extremely well with respect to wait times.  The average patient waits just over three 
minutes from the time he or she arrives in the waiting room until the moment they are called into 
the exam room by a medical assistant.  However, the relatively large standard deviation makes 
clear that the data are right-skewed: those waiting one standard deviation beyond the mean, for 
example, wait over 12 minutes.6  Furthermore, wait time is not pairwise correlated with any of the 
other variables called in the study. 
With respect to informal participation, on average, these employees scored 3.42, to the right of 
the neutral point on the scale.  Rounding out the independent variables is the two-way, 
multiplicative interaction term.  Note that the pairwise correlations, generally small in magnitude, 
provide evidence of discriminant validity between constructs (Schwab, 2005).  The only variables 
that appear to co-vary strongly are the two-way, multiplicative interaction term and its component, 
linear terms.  However, it makes sense that these variables would be very highly correlated and 
does not portend challenges for interpreting results from multivariate estimates (Friedrich, 1982). 
 
Duration Models 
Table 3 reveals the estimates for the duration models.  While Model 4 is the model that will 
ultimately reveal the lack of complementarity between formal and informal participation, that 
model is best understood by casting it against a set of simpler, nested models—Models 1-3.  Aside 
from the control for functional representation and the spatial and temporal dummies, Model 1 
includes only a single regressor for formal participation.  In this case, ?̂?𝛽Formal Participation= 0.13.  That 
the estimate is positive suggests that increases in formal participation are associated with increases 
in the “hazard” of one’s being called in for his or her appointment, implying reductions in wait 
times, and therefore, improvements in service quality.  However, the point estimate in no way 
approaches statistical significance, meaning this model does not provide evidence in support of 
any relationship between formal participation and wait times.  While this appears to contradict the 
theory alluded to above that links formal participation to performance, we are not especially 
concerned.  Since this estimate effectively constrains the coefficients on informal participation and 
on the two-way interaction term to be zero, it is, in a sense, misspecified. 
[----------Insert Table 3 about here.----------] 
23 
In Model 2, we substitute lagged informal participation for formal participation, yielding much 
the same result as the previous model.  While the coefficient is negatively signed, it in no way 
approaches statistical significance.  Like Model 1, this model renders a similar non-verdict with 
respect to informal participation.  That is, controlling only for functional representation and in the 
presence of the week and department dummies, there is no association between informal 
participation in the prior year and operational performance.  For interpretive ease and for the 
remainder of this paper, the informal participation variable has been centered at its neutral value 
of three on a five-point scale.  In preparation for a direct examination of the commingling of formal 
and informal participation, Model 3 includes both the formal participation and the lagged informal 
participation variables simultaneously in a purely additive framework (Friedrich, 1982).  This 
proves useful for understanding the way these two variables interact in the fourth and final model.  
Once again, both enter with insignificant point estimates, suggesting that neither variable has a 
simple, universal relationship to wait times completely unconditional on the value of the other 
variable. 
The next model serves as the most telling of the estimates.  Model 4, the multiplicative model, 
illustrates quantitatively the relationship between formal participation, informal participation and 
performance.  Since lagged informal participation has been centered at its neutral value, the 
positive estimate for formal participation implies that at neutral levels of informal participation, 
increases in formal participation are associated with increases in performance.  Likewise, the 
positive estimate for informal participation implies that in a department without a single worker 
claiming to be part of the formal participatory machinery, increases in informal participation the 
prior year are associated with improved performance in the form of shorter wait times.  In other 
words, once we control for functional representation and for unobservable temporal and spatial 
drivers of performance as well as for the interplay of formal and informal participation, we can 
finally see a clear, statistical connection between participation and performance.  Moreover, the 
negative partial slope on the interaction term implies that when workers report high levels of 
informal participation in the prior year, increases in formal participation this year are actually 
associated with poorer performance.  That is, Model 4 illustrates that while formal and informal 
participation each independently drive performance in a positive manner, formal and informal 
participatory structures do not appear to boost one another’s effectiveness in this particular setting.  
In fact, the estimates suggest that increases in either erode the effectiveness of the other. 
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[----------Insert Figure 2 about here.----------] 
These estimates are better understood graphically, and thus, we present them as such in Figure 
2.  Both panels show hazard functions fitted from Model 4 in Table 3.  That is, they are the relative 
likelihood that a patient gets “roomed” each minute beyond his or her scheduled appointment time.  
In panel (a.), informal participation is held at its minimum.  When we do this, we see that the 
hazard function at full formal participation sits above the fitted hazard function for either half or 
zero participation.  Since the “hazard” is getting “roomed,” a positive measure of service quality, 
we can say that when informal participation is low, increases in formal participation reduce wait 
times.  The second panel fixes informal participation at its maximum.  In this case, note that the 
order of the fitted hazard functions reverses.  That is, where workers report high levels of informal 
participation, increases in formal participation are actually associated with reductions in the 
hazard, i.e., longer, not shorter, wait times.  Thus, the figure lays bare what emerged from the 
estimates: in the case of these primary care departments, formal and informal participation do not 
complement one another in their impact on operational performance.  In fact, they appear to 
undermine one another’s positive impact on service quality. 
 
Discussion 
We intend neither the qualitative narrative nor the statistical analysis of this participation 
program to stand on its own.  Rather, we see the interview and observational materials, on the one 
hand, and the analysis of worker and patient data, on the other, coming together against the 
backdrop of existing theory on worker participation to form a rich explanation for how and why 
formal participatory structures and informal participative mechanisms could coalesce in the 
production or service-delivery process.  More specifically, we determined that in this particular 
setting, formal and informal participation did not reinforce the benefits of one another, but instead 
worked at cross-purposes to undermine one another’s effectiveness in reducing patient wait times. 
While we cited theory above predicting these dynamics, we also noted that the bulk of existing 
theory pointed toward a complementary rather than a conflictual relationship between these 
constructs (cf. Martinez Lucio, 2010).  Furthermore, we noted that we knew of only a single 
empirical study that explicitly examined the commingling of formal and informal participation.  
Yet, despite a similar case study design and mixed-methodological approach, Marchington and 
Suter (2013) conclude that formal and informal systems are, in fact, likely to complement one 
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another.  That is, in their setting, they found that informal participation, albeit preferred by 
managers and frontline workers over its formal alternatives, actually needed to be combined with 
a formal system in order to be effective. 
Given the extent to which Marchington and Suter’s (2013) findings deviate from ours, it is 
worth scrutinizing the differences between their case and ours to advance an explanation for the 
negative interaction that we found between formal and informal participation.  First, Marchington 
and Suter’s multi-method analysis is well-contextualized, and thus, instructive and convincing.  
Yet, the authors do not actually measure operational performance directly or indirectly or even 
perceptually.  Second, it is noteworthy that the apparent complementarity emerged at 
“RestaurantCo,” Marchington and Suter’s pseudonym for the nonunion chain of restaurants in 
which they undertook their research, whereas our negative interaction obtained in a unionized 
healthcare provider.  One can argue that unionization status is the key contingency determining 
the performance impact of layering a formal system on existing informal participative practices.  
Indeed, rather than considering unionism per se, one can imagine that unionized workers are more 
likely than nonunionized ones to view a formal participation program as a managerial “power 
grab” or in some other way as dissolving of trust (Guest et al., 2008; Guest & Peccei, 2001; 
Martinez Lucio, 2010).  This is one method by which union status could explain the discrepancy 
in findings. 
However, while unionization could somehow proxy for an absence of trust, it is probably even 
more likely to signal the breadth and depth of a formal worker participation program (Cox, 
Marchington, & Suter, 2009).  Whereas Marchington and Suter describe the formal participation 
program in their research setting as “dilute and localized” (p. 285), the one we examine—with 
manifestations at both the strategic and functional levels of the employment relationship, in 
addition to the workplace level (Litwin, 2015)—appears to be much more far-reaching and deeply-
rooted.  Theoretically, these attributes should advantage Kaiser Permanente’s program over the 
one in their organizational setting, as existing research makes clear that the most effective 
participation programs are those that are more deeply embedded in the organization (Cox, 
Zagelmeyer, & Marchington, 2006; Levine & Tyson, 1990; Litwin, 2015). 
Third, their case study analyses a chain of restaurants.  In our view, the routinized structure of 
work and the sources of motivation for frontline workers in the restaurant industry prove rather 
similar to those in the very manufacturing settings in which most participation research has been 
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undertaken and most participation programs have been instituted.  In those settings, participation 
schemes were a welcome response to rigid, Taylorist work structures in which workers were asked 
to “check their brains and their opinions at the door.”  Thus, opening the door to participation 
meant that opinionated workers with deep knowledge—be it explicit or tacit—finally had an 
opportunity through formal participative structures to influence the way they and their 
organizations undertook their work. 
On the contrary, Kaiser Permanente and the sector in which we analyze participation, 
healthcare, differ substantially from those settings in which much of the previous research and 
theory on worker participation has been advanced.  At Kaiser Permanente and in many other 
organizations and sectors that are just now embracing formal participation schemes, incumbent 
work structures are far from Taylorist, and their production processes or service-delivery systems 
already rely upon participation mechanisms, albeit, informal ones.  Thus, increasingly, we should 
expect to see formal participation introduced into environments in which it could potentially 
displace or interfere with the beneficial effects of informal participation. 
While it might surprise those who have only seen it used to describe the diffusion of policies 
and practices throughout an industry or an economy—institutional change, as theorized most 
notably by Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings (1986)—, institutional 
theory also offers useful and effective language to describe processes surrounding the creation, 
establishment, or emergence of institutions.  We believe this latter body of work illuminates the 
mechanisms that led to the conflictual relationship between formal and informal participation in 
our research setting. 
Two key ideas from the literature on institutional emergence proved especially helpful.  First, 
central and seminal to the institutions literature is the notion that institutions can be either 
“enacted”—designed strategically and intentionally by purposive actors—or, in Sumner’s (1906) 
parlance, “cressive”—evolving unintentionally via the interdependence of actors’ behaviors over 
an extended period of time.  Berger and Luckmann (1966) advanced this enacted vs. organic 
dichotomy by considering inter alia the processes that lead to the creation of institutions along this 
continuum, and more recent work has considered the extent to which institutions come about by 
authorization or writ as opposed to more gradual and less clearly-planned and less meticulously-
executed processes operating within societies or organizations (Strang & Sine, 2002). 
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In our view, these designations map naturally into the two forms of participation that we 
observed at Kaiser Permanente.  One’s membership in a unit-based team constitutes formal 
participation, and formal participation itself captures workers’ explicit involvement in the 
participatory structures created intentionally and designed deliberately by the organization, i.e., 
“agent-authorized” participatory structures (Strang & Sine, 2002).  What we observed at Kaiser 
Permanente was that informal participation can precede and maintain alongside formal 
participatory structures.  These are not agent-authorized like their formal counterparts, but would 
instead be characterized by seminal institutional theory as cressive and by contemporary theorists 
and researchers as “naturalistic” (Strang & Sine, 2002, p. 502)— 
…the unconscious way in which activities evolve as multiple 
actors…make sense of their common situation and then develop 
responses that over time become habitualized, reciprocally 
reinforced and passed onto others as “the way we handle this type 
of issue” (Scott, 2014, p. 114). 
Second, aside from there being two highly stylized “flavors” of institutions and avenues for 
their creation, enacted institutions are not created nor do organic institutions emerge 
abiogenetically in a space devoid of existing institutions.  Consequently, there is no reason to 
believe that the agent-based and naturalistic paths for institutionalizing participation would operate 
additively and independently at Kaiser Permanente or elsewhere.  Rather, the establishment of 
formal structures and processes, with their use of organizationally-authorized coercion as a 
mechanism for evoking participation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dornbusch & Scott, 1975), 
could actually constrain or suppress the positive relationship between informal participation and 
operational performance.  This would occur if those workers who might otherwise boost 
performance through the normatively-promoted informal participatory channels instead find that 
their adherence to formal rules and newly-institutionalized norms surrounding participation limits 
their ability to do so (Harlos, 2001). 
In more concrete terms, if frontline workers perceived themselves as participating even in the 
absence of a formal participation program, we would no longer necessarily expect the grafting of 
agent-authorized participatory structures upon naturalistic ones to boost operational performance.  
Neoinstitutional theorists argue that this phenomenon—in which agent-based institutions are not 
created in a vacuum, but rather must contend with and may well displace pre-existing naturalistic 
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ones—is quite common (Scott, 2014; Strang & Sine, 2002), particularly during times of 
institutional change such as that represented by an organization-wide attempt to formalize 
participation (DiMaggio, 1991).  In this case, the formalization of participation can work to 
control, constrain, or suppress the benefits of informal participation.  When this occurs, formal 
participation can dampen the otherwise positive effects of informal participation on performance. 
If one accepts this theory, then it can be used to proffer an explanation for the negative 
interaction between formal and informal participation that we observed in our research setting.  
The agent-authorized participatory structures on which most received research has been singularly 
focused are generally not designed and implemented in a “greenfield.”  Rather, they clash with workers’ 
existing beliefs and with established norms (Greif, 2006) regarding the extent of their influence and 
authority and the extent to which they can use it, in this case, in service to patients.  These naturalistic 
participatory institutions or practices are “built into” the social order (Jepperson, 1991), as many 
frontline workers had long been and continued to be concerned with increasing patient wait times and 
their impact on organizational performance and patient satisfaction. 
In short, we believe that a well-designed, formal, participative institutional structure—unit-based 
teams—proved effective at boosting performance in the organization that we analyze.  However, in 
some cases, these structures bumped up against existing institutions—informal participatory 
behaviors—that were themselves a positive influence on performance.  Where this occurred, the effect 
of the two institutions operating in tandem was not additive.  Rather, they eroded one another’s 
effectiveness. 
 
Generalizing beyond the Specific Case 
Readers are rightfully wary to generalize from case studies like ours, particularly if they view 
our single case as some sort of “sample” from which to extrapolate statistical probabilities, just as 
they would for large-sample, quantitative studies.  Instead, we would urge readers to extend our 
findings to situations outside of our study, based on the relevance of the theoretical explanation 
offered above—what Yin (2014) terms “analytic” as opposed to “statistical” generalization.  
Following this, the most important next step is to subject the theory to a larger and perhaps broader 
set of organizational settings in an effort to better determine scope conditions.  Simply contrasting 
our findings with those of Marchington and Suter (2013) points to the work setting, unionization 
status, the jobs themselves, the breadth and depth of the formal participation program, and the 
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details of the incumbent or pre-existing informal participative mechanisms as sensible attributes 
on which to pivot. 
Another way to jumpstart efforts toward generalization is to think more concretely about the 
circumstances that can give rise to a negative interaction between formal and informal participation 
like that we uncovered at Kaiser Permanente.  The most obvious possibility is that organizational 
leaders intentionally and perhaps strategically created what some have labeled “pseudo-
participative” structures (Detert & Treviño, 2010).  Under this scenario, formal participatory 
structures that first appear to increase the influence of frontline workers actually facilitate 
increased control on the part of organizational leaders (Barker, 1993; Martinez Lucio, 2010; 
Mulder, 1971). 
Even within a single organization in which management leaders are genuinely committed to 
participation—which we believe to be true at Kaiser Permanente—the negative interaction could 
nonetheless come about where managers do not adequately account for the interests and concerns 
of those intermediate workers in the organizational hierarchy—not themselves or the frontline 
workers around which the participative management program is directed, but rather first-line 
supervisors and the managers to whom they report.  While their actions and reactions to the 
program are a key determinant of its success, these managers have much to lose from the effective 
implementation of a participation scheme.  Even where organizational leaders have been careful 
to realign the commitments of frontline individuals with their organizational tasks and 
responsibilities, incentives for supervisors and second-line managers still favor control and 
outright accountability.  Without further attention, what results is a situation in which managers 
are asked to cede some decision-making and authority without giving up responsibility or true 
accountability for performance outcomes (McCaffrey et al., 1995).  Faced with incentives and 
interests better aligned with legacy work systems than with the participative ones they are 
supposed to be enacting, supervisors and second-line managers can appear to meet the order to 
create participatory structures while protecting their own interests, even in a labor relations climate 
as structured as the one we study, particularly if managers have any leeway to decide how to 
institute participation (Purcell & Hutchinson, 2007; Wilkinson, Dundon, Marchington, & Ackers, 
2004).  They can do this by setting the boundaries of participation to be more consultative than co-
determinative, offering participation opportunities that do not extend real power or decision-
making to frontline workers (Wilkinson & Dundon, 2010). 
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There is certainly no shortage of empirical evidence supporting this phenomenon in other 
settings, even unionized ones (e.g., Batt, 2004; Frenkel, Korczynski, Shire, & Tam, 1999).  That 
is, despite the careful design of formal, frontline participatory structures, they instead get absorbed 
into the existing institutional framework, with much less power and instrumentality over 
performance than higher-level managers had intended (Khilji & Wang, 2006).  These participatory 
structures spur backlash as a result of workers’ unfulfilled expectations with respect to newly-
promised discretion (Heller, Pusic, Strauss, & Wilpert, 1998)—particularly where important 
decisions are made by managers, behind closed doors, before frontline employees are brought into 
the process (Mintzberg, 1979). 
Given these dynamics and the theory that we offer to explain the negative interaction between 
formal and informal participatory structures, the events at Kaiser Permanente form a “critical 
case”—critical of our theory in the sense that it presents an environment in which one might least 
expect the theory of negative interaction to hold.  First, unlike the vast majority of formal 
participation programs, the one we analyze was not initiated solely by the employer.  True union 
involvement in the design and administration of the program circumscribes the likelihood that 
Kaiser Permanente management’s true motivation was union substitution or union suppression, 
dynamics that one could easily see allowing for the creation of formal structures that transfer power 
from the frontlines and thus displace the benefits of longstanding informal participatory 
mechanisms (Martinez Lucio, 2010). 
There were a number of other factors at play in our research setting that further work against 
our case’s ability to substantiate the negative interaction theory, and thus, bolster the case’s 
criticality.  Primary amongst these are that in contrast to workers in most organizational settings, 
Kaiser Permanente employees had both employment security and wage security.  Thus, they were 
in the rare but important position to find credible managers’ assertions that operational 
improvements resulting from the success of the frontline worker participation scheme would not 
come at the expense of participants’ own employment or wages or those of a co-worker.  Indeed, 
Pfeffer (1994) has argued such perceptions and policies, as rare as they are, are critical to the 
success of a formal worker participation program.  More broadly, others have argued that workers 
must perceive a relative balance of power with their employer (Eaton & Voos, 1994; McCaffrey 
et al., 1995) and have good reason to believe management leaders are genuinely committed to 
engaging workers in the formal participation program (Alvesson, 1995; Detert & Treviño, 2010).  
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In part because of its union status, our research setting actually provided workers with this sense 
of confidence in the formal participation program.  Consequently, were formal participation to 
complement informal participation in driving performance anywhere, it should be at Kaiser 
Permanente under the aegis of its labor management partnership.  Thus, in the net, we would argue 
that our chosen case presents a rather conservative test of the theory we propound (Batt & 
Hermans, 2012). 
 
Implications for Practice 
In an environment in which economic and regulatory pressures increasingly call for their 
adoption (Freeman et al., 2007; Kaufman & Taras, 2010), formal participative structures will only 
grow in their appeal to managers.  And, while we find that formal and informal participation 
undermine one another’s effectiveness in our research context, managers would be ill-advised to 
interpret these findings as a blanket advisory against joint consultative committees, works 
councils, and the like.  After all, our findings suggest that while formal participation appears to 
“crowd out” or displace much of the beneficial performance impact of informal participation, the 
main (or linear) statistical effect of formal participation on performance is positive.  As we noted 
above, our findings emerge from a case study, which means that managers must be wary of the 
fact that the context in which they manage assuredly differs from the one in which we established 
our results.  This puts the onus on them to determine the extent to which these differences should 
influence the applicability of our findings to their organizations.  If one accepts our institutional 
explanation for what transpired in our study, then a good rule of thumb would be to ask whether 
one’s organization operates more like Kaiser Permanente or more like the Taylorist workplaces 
that gave rise to early thinking and practice around worker participation.  Where formal 
participation programs are truly a reaction to Taylorism, then the negative interaction between 
formal and informal systems that we found may be less likely to obtain. 
Even in workplaces with high levels of informal participation, there may still be advantages to 
the introduction of formal structures, even if the establishment of the latter are costly and time-
consuming.  Consider, for example, that at Kaiser Permanente, in the absence of unit-based teams, 
there would be no mechanism for sharing emergent best-practices with other primary care 
departments, let alone organization-wide: when left to purely informal devices, circumstances and 
norms will tend to limit frontline workers to what Tucker and Edmondson (2002, 2003) label “first-
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order” problem-solving behaviors.  They, too, developed their theory in a healthcare setting, and 
explained first-order solutions as those that come about when a 
worker compensates for a problem by getting the supplies or 
information needed to finish a task that was blocked or interrupted.  
The worker does not address the underlying causes, thus not 
reducing the likelihood of a similar problem [occurring again] in the 
future.  (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003, p. 60) 
In the primary care departments that we studied, a medical assistant’s proactively reaching out to 
patients to postpone or reschedule an appointment, illustrated above, would constitute first-order 
problem-solving behavior, which in fact, address the immediate issue.  However, it does so by 
treating the symptoms and not the source of the underlying problem.  UBTs on the other hand are 
sanctioned, indeed are expected, to make much more material changes to the service delivery 
process, undertaking the sorts of problem-solving behaviors that researchers would label as 
“second-order.”  In our qualitative findings presented earlier, we explained how UBTs could 
experiment with altered scheduling practices and even staffing.  These sorts of solutions come 
about more deliberately and result from structured trial and error.  Moreover, as result of their 
being agent-authorized, they also benefit from their ability to effect deeper, systemic changes to 
existing routines, effectively broadening the boundaries of the set of possible solutions to a given 
service problem.  Tucker and Edmondson (2003) argue that organizations should prefer these 
second-order over first-order problem-solving—treating the sources rather than the mere 
symptoms of dysfunction.  Indeed, what undergirded Kaiser Permanente’s UBT program was the 
idea of identifying and disposing of underlying inefficiencies in the service process. 
Managers should also contemplate whether or not their own mental model for participation has 
been limited to formal participative structures as it was for so long for the scholarly researchers in 
this area, after which they should acknowledge the possibility that informal participatory 
mechanisms are already operating on the frontlines in their organizations.  This opens the door to 
their considering the dynamics of informal participation as it is practiced locally and to measure 
its impact on performance, much as we did here. 
Even in workplaces that reveal themselves to have high-functioning informal participative 
mechanisms, managers need not conclude that there is no place for formal participatory structures 
in their organization.  Rather, in designing and implementing the program, they should be sensitive 
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to the ways in which incumbent, informal practices operate on the frontlines.  Even more 
important, they must work proactively to mitigate the forces that bring formal practices into 
conflict with informal ones.  Namely, intra-organizational institutions, perhaps more consonant 
with legacy work systems than with newly-formalized participatory ones, are likely to encourage 
first-line managers to cling to control rather than to relinquish it to their frontline subordinates 
(Jackall, 1988).  Norms and customs regarding accountability and rewards tend to promote a 
particular power structure in which managers are both in charge of and responsible for 
departmental performance and frontline workers are responsible for doing what they are told.  
Therefore, of particular import with respect to the managerial approach to worker participation is 
the power shift that potentially results from the deployment of formal participatory structures.  In 
short, first-line managers and supervisors do not want to let go of power (Boxall & Purcell, 2010; 
Fenton-O’Creevy, 1998), particularly to the extent they will remain responsible for the economic 
success or failure of their particular organizational subunit (Klein, 2003). 
 
Conclusion 
This study leverages the spatial and contextual constraints and the relative homogeneity of the 
organizational subunits under study to hold steady many variables often unobserved (and 
sometimes even unacknowledged) in existing studies of frontline worker participation, including 
variation in product markets, technologies, labor costs, and competitive conditions (Batt & 
Hermans, 2012).  Moreover, the sharp focus of the research design permitted us to draw on a 
reliably-measured performance metric that was contextually relevant, valued by the organization, 
and tightly-coupled to the formal and informal participatory structures under examination.  It also 
enabled us to simultaneously collect fine-grained measures of formal and informal participation as 
opposed to simple indicators of whether or not a given firm employs participatory arrangements, 
a typical limitation of large-n studies of the participation-performance link.  And, the design 
permitted us to collect these employment relations and human resource management variables 
from a totally separate instrument and sample from those used to construct performance measures, 
thereby eschewing common-method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  Even 
more critically, our research design allowed us to mesh qualitative and quantitative support in 
service to one another—showing or demonstrating the emergence of the phenomenon by leaning 
34 
on a rich account of the processes that generated the data, i.e., the events surrounding the 
formalization of participation in the focal organization. 
Thus, while we appreciate that this case may raise as many new questions as it answers, we also 
believe that the events in this organization and in these workplaces contribute important insights 
into the circumstances that give rise to ways that formal and informal participation could work 
together to erode rather than complement one another’s beneficial impact.  The design of the case, 
enabled by a unique level of access to the organization and its constituent workplaces, allowed us 
to triangulate between interviews, observations, worker surveys, and patient satisfaction surveys 
to analyze the dynamics and the impact of grafting a well-designed formal participation program 
on workplaces that—to varying degrees—already had informal forms of participation in place.  
While this approach permitted us to open up the “black box” to understand the processes that 
generated the data, the growing number of workplaces embodying both formal and informal forms 
of participation underlines the need for future research to establish scope conditions and the precise 
limits to this case’s generalizability.  Accordingly, we hope this case study will serve as an early 
step in an ongoing conversation between scholars of labor relations, work, organizations, and 
human resource management on the ways that formal and informal manifestations of frontline 
worker participation come together to shape organizational performance. 
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Variable Construction Source
Wait Time continuous variable 
measured in minutes
post-visit patient satisfaction 
survey
Formal Participation binary variable in which 1 = 
“yes” and 0 = “no”
annual employee survey
Informal Participation summative scale measured 
as a continuous variable 
ranging from 1 to 5, i.e., low 
to high, constructed from 4 
items (α = .84)
annual employee survey
“I have enough say in 
how I do my job.”
ordered categorical variable 
ranging from 1 to 5, i.e., 
“strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”
annual employee survey
“I can quickly access 
the information I need 
to do my job 
effectively.”
(Same as above.) annual employee survey
“I have the decision-
making authority I 
need to meet the needs 
of… patients and 
customers.”
(Same as above.) annual employee survey
“In general, how much 
say or influence do you 
have over decisions 
affecting your work?”
ordered categorical variable 
ranging from 1 to 5, i.e., 
“none” to “a great deal”
annual employee survey
Functional Representation continuous variable ranging 
from 1 to 6
annual employee surveynumber of distinct job 
classifications reporting UBT 
membership
TABLE 1.  Definitions and Construction of Variables
Definition/Survey Item(s)
“About how long did you wait in 
the waiting room past your 
scheduled appointment time?”
“Are you a member of a Labor 
Management Partnership (LMP) 
unit-based team (UBT)?”
extent to which department 
members report having the 
authority, influence, and information 
necessary to perform their jobs
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# Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4
1 Wait Timet 3.05 9.36 1.00
2 Formal Participationt .49 .18 .02
*** 1.00
3 Informal Participationt-1 3.42 .31 .01
** -.09*** 1.00
4 Formal Participationt  × Informal Participationt-1 1.69 .62 .02
*** .96*** .17*** 1.00
5 Functional Representationt 3.79 1.19 -.01 .10
*** .03*** .12***
Key   * p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.01.
TABLE 2.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Embedded Units
Notes  n  = 29,743 patient visits.
44 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Formal Participationt 0.13 0.13 0.39
***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
Informal Participationt-1 -.04 -.04 0.38
***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.16)
Formal Participationt  × Informal Participationt-1 -0.73
***
(0.26)
Functional Representationt 0.05
* 0.06** 0.05* 0.05**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
includes department dummies yes yes yes yes
includes time dummies yes yes yes yes
number of departments 27 27 27 27
number of department-years 53 53 53 53
number of patients 29,743 29,743 29,743 29,743
Key:   * p <.10, **p <.05, ***p <.01.
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates (and standard errors) from shared-frailty Weibull regressions of the number
of minutes a patient waits in the waiting room beyond his or her scheduled appointment time.  Frailties are shared at the 
department-year level.
TABLE 3. Shared-Frailty Weibull Proportional Hazard Models of the
Impact of Formal Participation and Informal Participation on Reported Wait
Times
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FIGURE 1.  Model of the Relationship between Formal Participation, Informal Participation, and Organizational Performance in 27 
Primary Care Departments 
 
 Formal Participation 
+ 
+ 
+ or - 
Complementary… 
- formalization of worker participation 
reinforces the existing performance benefits 
arising from informal participation (+) 
 
…or Conflictual? 
- formalization of worker participation 
“crowds out,” squelches, or dampens the 
existing performance benefits arising from 
informal participation (-) 
 
Informal Participation Organizational Performance 
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2 Of the 16 UBTs in the preliminary study, two of them were in the same region as the 27 departments we study in-
depth in the present analysis.  However, neither of those two UBTs from the national study were primary care UBTs.  
Thus, there is no overlap or intersection between the “original” 16 UBTs and the departments analyzed herein. 
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In the mainly private-sector, competitive healthcare landscape of the U.S., service and cost reign supreme.  Kaiser 
Permanente’s business model is one that relies on scale, scope, and low costs, suggesting that patients give up a degree 
of intimacy in exchange for efficiency, timeliness included.  Furthermore, Kaiser Permanente operates a closed 
network.  Thus, when patients are dissatisfied, they are likely to leave the plan altogether, not just their particular 
provider. 
                                                            
